

interpretation) the resulting opinion poll data will also be faulty or biased' (p. 40). This theme is present throughout the book, but takes different shapes and forms, for instance the hard question/easy question dichotomy. This provides a very useful perspective on opinion poll data, a valuable contrast to the way in which the media and political actors use poll data for their own purposes.

In terms of the substance of Irish public opinion, this volume also merits its place in the contemporary literature on Irish politics. With respect to Northern Ireland, Lyons shows that Irish (taken to mean the Republic of Ireland) public opinion consistently favours peace over unification. This finding is hardly surprising to casual observers of Irish politics; nevertheless, it is useful that this could be shown in such a comprehensive way given how difficult it was for certain groupings (on both 'sides') to end their violent activities on the island of Ireland. Lyons also makes some interesting points in relation to public opinion towards the EU. He highlights the question of how it is possible that opinion polls show favourable EU attitudes, and yet pro-EU parties and other campaigners lose one EU referendum after the other (pp. 204–5). The answer might be that just as opinion polls take place in a specific place at a specific time, so do referendums. In that sense, a referendum result is subject to some of the same factors as opinion poll results.

The chapter on the 'liberal agenda' is also particularly interesting because of the light it sheds on the relationship between the public and its elected representatives. The central question here is how much out of step representatives may be with those they represent without putting dents in the democratic legitimacy of their decisions. As the author shows in his book, Irish public opinion was very conservative on 'moral' issues such as divorce, abortion and homosexuality. However, public opinion became much less conservative on the latter issue in the early 1990s, following new, liberal legislation in that area of the law. Notably, there was no referendum on homosexuality (presumably since the original legislation against it was not constitutionally entrenched). On abortion and divorce several referendums have taken place and on these issues Lyons observes continued conservatism. As the ban on divorce was lifted in the mid-1990s, the public became more liberal in this issue, too, Lyons shows. Ergo: legislation is a mechanism of opinion change, as much as – probably – opinion change is a mechanism of legislative change. Unfortunately, we still do not know a lot about exactly how these mechanisms operate, although Lyons outlines a number of possible scenarios.

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### **Eurostars and Eurocities**

By Adrian Favell

*Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2008, 296 pp., £19.99, ISBN 978-1-4051-3404-0 (pbk), £55, ISBN 978-1-4051-3405-7 (hbk)*

Adrian Favell's *Eurostars and Eurocities* investigates migration within Europe, focusing on West Europeans who have left their countries of origin to live elsewhere in Europe. This kind of migration seems the inevitable and even desirable outcome of European integration, but yet 'Eurostars' are remarkably uncommon: less than 2 per cent of West Europeans live and work aboard in the continent. Favell seeks to explain this paradox.

He does so via a years-long qualitative project, involving 60 interviews with Eurostars in three different 'Eurocities', Amsterdam, Brussels, and London. With these data, he paints colourful portraits of these individuals and locates these portraits within the broader landscape of migration and its challenges.

Favell argues that the decision to migrate derives from not only a 'rational' desire for professional advancement, but also personal relationships and institutionalised networks that connect certain countries. For some, migration reflects a lack of social mobility at home. For some others, it derives from negotiations with their partner or spouse. In short, migration cannot be understood as a simple cost–benefit calculation.

Favell then discusses the challenges that arise after migration. One concerns the question of identity. Eurostars do not want to be seen as expatriates or even migrants. Some retain a primary allegiance to their country of origin. Others profess a dual identity to their country of origin and to their host country. Still others reject national categories and profess to be only 'European'. The integrationist project does not simply convert national categories into a pan-European identity. Instead, it creates layers of identities, whose salience varies across individuals and, at times, within individuals depending on their location. As a French woman living in London puts it: 'I feel French in England, and English in France'.

Then there is the question of integration, whose challenges are even more acute. Despite the 'de-nationalised' thrust of integration, Eurostars find that their new host countries are still quite 'nationalised', with indigenous cultures and institutions that remain inscrutable or unavailable to migrants. These include schools, the health care system, pensions, the real estate market, and the social rituals of natives. One colourful example involves Eurostars living in London who feel that they must join their British colleagues for a tedious dozen pints at the local pub after work. To be sure, integration is easier in some places than others. In Favell's telling, Brussels is more hospitable than London or Amsterdam. Indeed, the accounts of life in each city – derived from Favell's and his subjects' experiences – are an ancillary pleasure of the book.

The book concludes at loose ends. Favell repeats the question underlying the paradox: whether there is really a new de-nationalised Europe or whether the old continent, with its fractious national categories, endures. In my reading, the Eurostars' stories suggest the continuing power of national cultures despite the flows of capital, culture, and persons across borders. And, although Favell tends to contrast cultural and economic accounts, one can easily see a rationalist explanation for these durable cultures: the enormous investment that nationals have in their customs and norms makes it costly to change or adapt them in response to migrants. Thus, it is migrants who often find themselves adapting, or, despite their best intentions, settling into a sub-cultural niche with their co-nationals or other migrants. But if a new Europe is to emerge despite the current climate of Euro-scepticism and hostility to immigrants, Favell is right to locate its origins in the quotidian – that is, in the 'banal, everyday adaptations' of Eurostars and other migrants. As the European project pushes forward, other scholars will do well to follow in Favell's path.

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### **Who Gets What? Domestic Influences on International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources**

By Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir

*State University of New York Press, Albany, 2008, xii + 180 pp., £30, ISBN 978-0-7914-7539-3 (hbk)*

Management of 'straddling' fish stocks that range across the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of more than one state or both inside the 200 nautical mile outer limit of EEZs and the international waters outside poses one of the canonical collective action problems: allocating shares of a shared resource among rival users. The relevant international agreements, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1995 Straddling Stocks